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IN SUPPORT OF MORAL ABSOLUTES
CANDACE VOGLER

I

N September of 1988, John Finnis gave the four Michael J. McGivney
Lectures at the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage
and the Family in Washington, D.C. The lectures—Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth—were published a few years later.1 The lectures
are very ambitious. I intend my remarks today as a friendly analytic philosopher’s contribution on this theme.
Finnis’s work in ethics is magisterial and wide-ranging. My concern is
very narrow. Finnis argues that religion is one among several goods important to the fulfillment of whole human persons.2 The bulk of Finnis’s
work in practical philosophy, generally, and ethics in particular, rests on
thought about human good and practical reasonableness. Theology informs the project, but does not serve as a foundation for the practical
philosophy. I will urge that we need theology for some of it.
Now, a clever philosopher can make a lot of headway in neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy without relying upon sacred doctrine. Part of the
reason that Elizabeth Anscombe urged philosophers who had been involved in lengthy disputation over the character of moral law to stop hunting for the special moral ought and return to Aristotle in 1958 was that
nothing in Aristotle’s practical philosophy rests in thought about an almighty god who is at once creator and a legislator.3 Things are less clear
when neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy draws from Aquinas.
Finnis does not rely upon Thomistic or Aristotelian thought about the
final end of human life to make his case. He holds both that good is to be
pursued, and evil avoided, and that bonum est multiplex. All things pursued
by mature human beings with their wits about them are, as my colleagues
put it these days, pursued under the guise of the good,4 but, Finnis adds
1. See JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH
(1991).
2. As the topic emerges in an essay co-written with Germain Grisez and Joseph
Boyle, religion is one of the forms of harmony and peace at issue in reflexive
goods: “peace with God, or the gods, or some nontheistic but more-than-human
source of meaning and value.” Germain Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle & John Finnis,
Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 99, 108 (1987).
3. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958), in ETHICS, RELIGION
AND POLITICS: THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G. E. M. ANSCOMBE 26-42
(Univ. of Minn. Press 1981); more recently reprinted in HUMAN LIFE, ACTION, AND
ETHICS: ESSAYS BY G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, 169-94 (Mary Geach & Luke Gormally eds.,
Imprint Academic 2005).
4. For an excellent discussion of the recent philosophical wrangle over
whether what humans pursue is pursued sub specie boni, see Doug Lavin & Matthew
Boyle, Goodness and Desire, in DESIRE, PRACTICAL REASON, AND THE GOOD 161-201
(Sergio Tennenbaum ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).
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(in a way not entirely unlike the way in which Anscombe makes a similar
addition) the plurality and incommensurability of human good is such
that not everything done within reason is done toward a single grand end.
Finnis does, however, adopt a Thomistic structural emphasis on law in ethics—practical reasonableness guides choice—that is, does its principled—
or precept—or norm—or natural-law-governed—work from an agent’s apprehension of overall human good. Reasonable pursuit of human flourishing constitutes an agent’s participation in overall human good. And
the kind of law at issue in Finnis’s practical philosophy is, of course, natural law.
Just as you might turn to Aristotle on justice to regain your philosophical footing having become convinced that attempting to isolate the special moral law in the absence of divine law had put you in a muddle, so too
you do not have to lean on God in order to make some headway developing work about natural law for an audience that cannot be presumed to
share a commitment to a confessional tradition. Natural law is supposed
to be promulgated through natural reason, and should find secure
enough footing there to illuminate many issues in practical philosophy.
But the very philosophical work that teaches us to rely upon the sort of
thing that Finnis treats under the heading of “reasonableness” also teaches
us that natural law is rooted in divine law. And this point ought to give us
pause. It ought to make us suspect that there are some questions in neoAristotelian practical philosophy informed by Thomism that cannot be answered apart from reliance on the theological framework that directed our
attention to natural law in the first place.
With this in mind, my narrow question is this: can one ground absolute moral prohibitions without theology?5
Immanuel Kant, whose god is a postulate of practical reason rather
than a creator and legislator, thought that we could understand the force
of absolute prohibition without theological guidance, and Kant’s approach to this question is strikingly similar to Finnis’s at one point (but
diverges at another). More recently, two Anglophone philosophers whose
work is especially congenial to Finnis’s project—Anscombe and Peter
Geach—have implied or claimed outright that we need to understand natural law in its relation to divine law in order to understand the philosophical foundations of exceptionless moral norms.

5. Aristotle, working before the advent of the relevant theological traditions,
apparently thought that philosophy could not help us with a related question,
namely, whether just interaction was possible between two human beings who had
nothing in common. Finnis raises the question of whether Aristotle has an account of absolute prohibitions in JOHN FINNIS, Moral Absolutes in Aristotle and Aquinas, in 1 REASON IN ACTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS, 187-98(2011). He does not focus
the discussion on the question of the scope of justice in Aristotle, which is where
contemporary Anglophone ethicists working to respond to Anscombe’s call locate
the hard questions.
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My approach to this question in Finnis will be artificial. I will take
apart what amounts to Finnis’s single response to a serious objection, separating it into three distinct strands, or lines, of argument. I will set aside
the first of these as not making the right sort of contact with a strongest
form of the objection, which I take from Peter Geach. I will offer a Kantian construe of the second that requires no theology. Finally, I will turn to
the third. The third strand carries what is off to the side in the first two—
namely, an invocation of sacred doctrine and, through it, implicitly, of
divine law. My treatment of the third strand will be brief, but the third
strand succeeds in providing rational grounding for exceptionless moral
norms—those norms at issue in absolute moral prohibitions.
I. EXCEPTIONLESS MORAL NORMS
Moral Absolutes is about what Finnis calls “exceptionless moral
norms.”6 Michael Thompson has provided excellent arguments for the
claim that, in one sense, all moral norms are exceptionless. Here is the
sense in which this is the case: no sound articulation of the content of a
moral norm writes the exceptions into the rule.7 On this understanding,
6. Finnis uses norm, rather than precept or principle, terms he treats as roughly
synonymous with norm in some other writings. The term covers a very wide range
of different kinds of patterned activity and conduct in different kinds of human
communities. What they all have in common is that: (A) there is such a thing as
failing to meet the norm-governed expectations of adept participants; and, (B)
one is held accountable for the failure in meeting such expectations. If I understand him, Finnis uses norm for three reasons:
1. Norm is a term in common use across various disciplines to denote
socially sanctioned sameness in a specific area of human activity.
2. Most mature participants in a norm-governed area of human activity
do not explicitly formulate the standards at issue in the relevant norms,
and many may actually be surprised to learn that their activity is patterned or ordered in the relevant sense. Undergraduates in an elementary logic course, for example, may be surprised to notice that in
understanding why it is bad to be on the receiving end of a sentence of
the form ‘If you loved me, then you’d do such-and-such,’ they display
their understanding of modus (tollendo) tollens.
3. The combination of (1) and (2) makes it the case that norm captures
something of the sense of principle in scholastic medieval philosophy—at
once an articulation of the content of a standard and a source of the
order so-described, produced, and regulated.
7. Michael Thompson’s first argument to this effect concerns the logic of
judgments about the nature of species of living things. See Michael Thompson, The
Representation of Life, in VIRTUES AND REASONS: PHILIPPA FOOT AND MORAL THEORY
280-96 (Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, & Warren Quinn, eds., Clarendon
Press 1995). The point is that judgments about species of living things are irreducible, are not to be assimilated to statistical or ceteris-paribus-framed generalizations,
behave in the same way as Fregean universal judgments, and, as such, resist any
attempt to “write in” the content of exceptions to the natural historical “rules” they
express. The similarity between these judgments and the kind at issue in ethical
judgment is taken up and worked through in different ways in Thompson’s larger
project. He makes a similar case about judgments expressible in sentences like
“Pacta sund servanda”—promises are to be kept. See MICHAEL THOMPSON, Other
Practices, Other Dispositions: An Indirect Articulation of the Specifically Practical-Philosoph-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 5 [2012], Art. 9
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-5\VLR509.txt

896

unknown

Seq: 4

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

27-DEC-12

11:25

[Vol. 57: p. 893

every sound articulation of the content of a moral norm represents that
content shorn of any exceptions. You do not need any theology to get
this. All you need is alert, creative, and serious work in old-fashioned analytic Anglophone predicate logic and philosophy of language. Combine
that with any non-theistic account of the foundations of ethics and you
have thereby given an account of moral norms such that the content of
those norms is necessarily exceptionless.
This is not what Finnis is after. Finnis means to focus our attention
on some among many moral norms that have special force. And in drawing our attention to these, what Finnis is after is very ambitious. It goes
well beyond the tiny set of absolute moral prohibitions that many (although by no means all) contemporary Anglophone ethicists are willing to
admit—prohibitions on such acts as deliberately securing the judicial condemnation of a man you know to be innocent—to acts of contraceptive
sexual intercourse, onanism, or sodomy.
Anscombe argued against contraceptive sexual intercourse without
relying upon sacred doctrine.8 She did not think that her argument, or
one like it, could be deployed against, e.g., sodomy.9 For the remainder of
this talk, I will concentrate upon the kinds of acts that many contemporary
non-theistic ethicists will suppose are never permitted—acts like murder,
rape, and torture.
II. PETER GEACH’S OBJECTION
To take up the kinds of prohibitions that many anti-theistic moral
philosophers will countenance, consider Geach’s challenge to neo-Aristotelian ethics:
ical Conception of Practices and Dispositions, in LIFE AND ACTION: ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF PRACTICE AND PRACTICAL THOUGHT 183-91(2008).
8. See G. E. M. Anscombe, You Can Have Sex Without Children: Christianity and
the New Deal, in THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF G. E. M. ANSCOMBE:
ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 82-96 (1981).
9. Anscombe’s argument depends upon thought about as-such-generative
acts—namely, for human beings, the kind of sexual intercourse that might prompt
partners to take contraceptive measures precisely in order to prevent procreation.
This form of sexual union has special prominence in the lives of human beings
because it is how we reproduce our species. One can argue, as Anscombe does,
that it is not up to us to determine the end of such a kind of act, nor to deploy it as
one among many means in attaining other ends. The argument can be made, as
Anscombe’s is, simply by way of reflection on the place of this act in human life
more generally. It is another matter entirely to try to argue on behalf of prohibitions on kinds of sexual acts that have no special place in an overall understanding
of human life and human flourishing.
The difficulties here are not trivial. The concern emerges from an audience
that cannot be presumed to have any specific theological commitments beyond an
interest in being in harmony with some larger-than-human source of meaning and
value. Umbandistas in Sao Paolo, Buddhists in San Francisco, and male citizens in
ancient Athens all might well have that going for them.
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[Somebody] might very well admit that not only is there something bad about certain acts, but also it is desirable to become
the sort of person who needs to act in the contrary way; and yet
not admit that such acts are to be avoided in all circumstances
and at any price. To be sure, a virtuous person cannot be ready
in advance to do such acts; and if he does do them they will damage his virtuous habits and perhaps irreparably wreck his hardwon integrity of soul. But at this point someone may protest ‘Are
you the only person to be considered? Suppose the price of your
precious integrity is a most fearful disaster! Haven’t you got a
hand to burn for your country (or mankind) and your friends?’
This sort of appeal has not, I think, been adequately answered on
Aristotelian lines, either by Aristotle or by Mrs. Foot.10
If I understand him, Finnis has three strands of response to this sort
of challenge. The first is given at length By Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez,11
with additional support in a subsequent essay by Finnis.12 It concerns the
question whether there could be a sound policy based upon standing prepared to commit intrinsically wrongful acts for the sake of preserving a
great good, and/or preventing great evil. Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez argue
that no such policy could be morally sound.13
Suppose that they are right. Is the argument enough to answer
Geach’s objection?
It is fairly clear from the context that Geach means to point to the
kind of example ordinarily given in support of doing a bad sort of thing
for the sake of securing great good or avoiding catastrophe. It is normally
the case in these examples that we are invited to imagine an agent who is
very nearly uniquely positioned to do the bad act in question, and are
being asked to consider the particular bad act in isolation from that
agent’s ordinary practical tendencies.
Geach is not suggesting that there could be a sound policy or rule that
favors taking, or threatening to take, wrongful means to exalted ends in
general; neither does he suggest that virtue could favor such acts.14
Geach’s objection instead is geared to highly specific circumstances, and
10. See Peter Geach, The Moral Law and the Law of God, in GOD AND THE SOUL
123 (Routledge 1978).
11. See JOHN FINNIS, JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR. & GERMAIN GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND REALISM, (Clarendon Press 1987).
12. See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 187-98.
13. They make their argument on the basis of common morality, arguing that
this morality has its origins in Judeo-Christian thought and practice. If Anscombe
is right, such appeals are tacit appeals to divine law, and so do not reach out beyond the community of the faithful in the right sort of way to persuade an audience of non-believers; see MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3. It is beyond
the scope of this essay to investigate whether Anscombe’s objection will tell against
the nuclear deterrence argument.
14. In these respects, the objection is unlike objections that might be made to
prohibitions of non-contraceptive sexual acts that have been condoned and sub-
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could involve human agents who are very nearly uniquely positioned to
commit the wrong in question.
Barring a serious argument on uncontroversial grounds that there is
no important difference between general policy questions and questions
concerning particular acts under specific sorts of circumstances, the first
response does not make the right sort of contact with Geach’s objection to
provide an adequate response.15
Finnis’s second line of response does. The second line goes like this:
the only way to support the claim that some individual agent may be required to perform a wrongful act in order to avert catastrophe is with reference to an estimate of the likelihood that disaster will ensue should that
individual refuse to do wrong. No such estimate of the future is sound.
III. TOUCHING HUME

AND

TURNING

TO

KANT

There are two obvious ways to construe Finnis’s second line of response. The first is Humean and takes it that the argument comes to rest
in the infamous problem of induction. This is not the way in which Finnis
ought to be read.
The problem with invoking general skepticism about inductive inference here is that the response threatens to undermine some of the
grounds used to establish other crucial points in Finnis’s position.16
jected to various forms of governance in law, custom, and conscience in some
human communities. The concern there is general.
15. Lately, one major Anglophone Kant scholar has given an interpretation of
Kant’s practical philosophy such that there is no interesting difference, for Kant,
between choice of policy and choice of a specific act under specific circumstances
by a specifically positioned, finite, dependent, rational agent. See STEPHEN ENGSTROM, THE FORM OF PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE: A STUDY OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (Harvard Univ. Press 2009). The view is controversial, both in its own right
and as a reading of Kant. It also is at odds with some aspects of neo-Aristotelian
practical philosophy and, on some readings, some aspects of Aquinas’s practical
philosophy.
16. Finnis, for example, uses empirical findings in social science to support
claims about the operation of natural reason and natural law in human life generally. It is extremely difficult to find any region of natural or social science that is
entirely immune to questions about the soundness of inductive inference. Further, on the face of it, at least, it is exceedingly difficult to give a compelling account of the importance of human experience in our pursuit of knowledge
generally if we embrace Humean skepticism about induction in its strongest form.
And we will need a very strong form of Humeanism to provide support to the claim
that it is, in effect, inconceivable that we confidently can predict disaster should our
unfortunate agent refuse to do wrong. After all, entire industries that deal in risk,
imperfect information, and uncertainty rely upon elaborate mathematical models
for estimating the future. Although there are notorious problems applying the
probability calculus to one-off events, as long as our unfortunate agent is in a kind
of position involving kinds of circumstances and kinds of opponents and kinds of threats,
and as long as the wrong urged upon him is a kind of act, we can, if necessary, enlist
the aid of the actuaries, the statisticians, the criminal profile specialists, the military, or the practitioners of the relevant branches of engineering and the special
sciences to give us an estimate of the scope of the threatened disaster and the
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Humeanism will take its stand alongside Finnis in this matter, but one
does not want the defense of one’s argument to be in the hands of the
Humean skeptic. That particular philosophical comrade-in-arms is as
likely to turn his weapons upon you as he is to attack your enemy.
So suppose the worst-case scenario version of Geach’s objection: suppose that as many of the relevant experts as we like can be marshaled, each
armed with the vast resources of a field of serious scientific inquiry, each
experienced, each mature, each having considered the terrible threat—
suppose all that and that they all agree that the threat of disaster is credible, that our unfortunate agent is in a position to make a real difference,
and that the most efficient way of doing so will involve him doing suchand-such (an act described in the kinds of non-moral terms favored
among such experts; an act that will be an act of murder or torture or rape
or deliberately securing the judicial condemnation of an innocent person,
or some such). Return to Finnis’s second line of response and try a different construe. Enlist Kant rather than Hume.
Kant’s most famous example of such a case involves a murderer who
comes to the door and asks whether so-and-so is in your house; so-and-so is
in your house; and Kant argues that you are required to tell the murderer
as much even though the murderer intends to murder so-and-so.17
The relevant passages have excited considerable controversy among
Kant scholars and neo-Kantians. Christine Korsgaard approaches the issue
by considering the relation between the prohibition on lying and various
formulations of the categorical imperative, then softens the blow by urging
that Kant provides an ideal moral theory based in a capacious understanding of human good, rather than a theory so pinched that Kant cannot see
that many people will suppose that, far from being forbidden to lie to the
murderer at the door, one might be morally required to lie; she argues that
Kant will allow us to formulate special principles for the sake of dealing
with evil.18
If I understand Kant, one ought not to try to soften his remarks about
lying. Further, I do not think that the best way to go about supporting
Kant’s assumption that there is such a prohibition is by way of meditation
on apparent differences between the categorical imperative formulae. If
we look to other aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy for guidance, a very
different argument in support of his discussion of the murderer at the
door emerges, one that looks to be potentially useful to Finnis. That line
of argument begins by noticing that when we consider the causal order of
natural events, we find one event, followed by another, and then another.
likelihood that the imagined wrongful intervention will avert it or in some other
way help to alter the course of wretched human events.
17. See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Supposed Right to Lie From Altruistic Motives, in
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 346-50
(Lewis White Beck ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1949).
18. See Christine Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, PHIL. &
PUB. AFF., Autumn 1986, at 325-49.
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The world as it emerges in the perspective of modern science, Kant
thought, has no room for thought about what is supposed to happen. It is
built upon thought about what actually does, or did, or will happen. The
kind of orientation to the future at issue in apprehending a series of physical events as such is, Kant thought, fundamentally and formally different
from the orientation to the future at issue in practical reason. Practical
reason seeks to bring about what is supposed to happen.
In effect, by making a calculation about what will happen if you lie,
you throw in your lot with the merely natural order of events. To throw in
your lot with the merely natural flow of events is to abandon the special
way in which practical reason rightly orients itself to the future.
Michael Thompson updates and expands upon the relevant distinction between what happens and what is supposed to happen like this:
In learning of the various cellular processes unearthed and described in biochemistry—photosynthesis, for example, or the
Krebs cycle, or the replication of DNA—one is inclined to think,
It’s all getting boiled down to physics and chemistry, isn’t it?, and
in some sense of “boiling down” this is of course true. But it is
interesting that if the only categories we have to apply are those
of chemistry and physics, there is an obvious sense in which none
of these goings-on will add up to a single process. In a description
of photosynthesis, for example, we read of one chemical process—one process-in-the-sense-of-chemistry—followed by another, and then another. Having read along a bit with mounting
enthusiasm, we can ask: “And what happens next?” If we are
stuck with chemical and physical categories, the only answer will
be: “Well, it depends on whether an H-bomb goes off, or the temperature plummets toward absolute zero, or it all falls into a vat
of sulphuric acid . . . “ That a certain enzyme will appear, and
split the latest chemical product into two, is just one among many
possibilities. Physics and chemistry, adequately developed, can
tell you what happens in any of these circumstances—in any circumstance—but it seems that they cannot attach any sense to the
question “What happens next?”, sans phrase. The biochemical
treatise appears to make implicit play with a special determination of the abstract conception of a process, one distinct from
any expressed in physics or chemistry proper.19
Human acts, like vital processes more generally, only come into view
through an understanding of what is supposed to happen—of the aim or
point or good at issue in the process. From the point of view of a mere
chain of events—the kind of thing we find when we consider physical and
19. Michael Thompson, The Representation of Life, in VIRTUES AND REASONS:
PHILIPPA FOOT AND MORAL THEORY 260-61 (Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence
& Warren Quinn eds., Clarendon Press 1995)
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chemical events as such—there is no such thing as what is supposed to happen. This is another way of drawing the distinction at issue for Kant in his
work on the special orientation to the future that belongs to practical
reason.
In this sense, it is already a mistake to treat my own act in prospect as
one among indefinitely many things that might happen. The kind of process in question—intentional action—can only be brought into view
through an understanding of how things are supposed to go from the perspective of the agent.
To capture the second aspect of Kant’s argument, we need to add one
of the core aspects of the orientation to the future at issue in intelligent
action. This piece concerns an asymmetry between the way good and bad
falls to the agent as a result of her action:
1. I am responsible for the bad outcomes of a bad act, but get no
credit for any good accomplished through my misconduct.
2. I get credit for the good outcomes of a good act and, when I
choose well and act well, I am not responsible for bad outcomes
of good acts.
This asymmetry is ubiquitous in our evaluation of human action; it shapes
our assessment of both particular acts and large-scale implementation of
policy measures.20
Kant holds that there is an absolute prohibition against lying.21 Because it is always wrong to lie, lying to the murderer at the door in order to
get him to leave your guest in peace involves a serious error in the exercise
of practical reason. Firstly, it depends upon a kind of calculation of consequences that can never be used to support a contention about what ought to
happen, but at best treats my own act in prospect as if it were a mere
physical or chemical happening. No mere physical or chemical happening can have the relation to good and bad at issue in intelligent choice.
And, because of this, secondly, if I do lie to the murderer at the door and
he leaves, I can no more take credit for this happy event than a violently
abusive parent can take credit if his children decide to turn their backs on
their unhappy childhoods and do everything in their power to provide
safe and loving homes for their own children when they are grown. Even
if the children say that they learned the value of tender parenting through
long years of abuse, this does not make it the case that their parents can
congratulate themselves on a job well done.
20. I argue that this aspect of practical reason is ubiquitous in Candace Vogler, For Want of a Nail, CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS, Aug. 2008, at 187-205.
21. Korsgaard’s account of the relevant passages in Kant rests in her account
of a strong Kantian derivation of the prohibition on lying. I read Kant’s discussion
of the categorical imperative differently, but Korsgaard does a nice job of explaining some of the grounds for Kant’s understanding of the wrong of lying. See Christine Korsgaard, supra note 18, at 325-49. For Finnis’s account of the absolute
prohibitions, including the absolute prohibition on lying, in Aquinas, see John
Finnis, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 163-70 (Oxford Univ. Press
1998).
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What Kant saw is that Hume’s skepticism about inductive reasoning
does not so much as make contact with practical reasoning—reasoning that
aims at making things as they should be in and through intelligent choice.
No amount of information about what has happened or is likely to happen
can settle a question about what is supposed to happen. Assemble all the
experts you like. Get them to generate as many predictions as you please
from the most elaborate statistical models they can muster. Their knowledge cannot alter a truth about what is supposed to happen even if they
can confidently predict that a murderer at the door is more likely to leave
his intended victim in peace if you tell a lie than if you tell the truth. If
Kant (and Aquinas) are right in thinking that there is an absolute prohibition on lying, then you cannot pursue good by means of a lie for, Kant will
say, if some good comes of it, that good cannot be counted as one of your
practical achievements—and for this reason, it cannot serve as the intended end of your act. Any evil that comes of your lie, on the other hand,
will follow that lie back to your doorstep.
In this sense, Kant’s construe supports Finnis’s second line of response to Geach’s objection.22
IV. THE TROUBLE

WITH THE

KANTIAN RESPONSE

Kant’s way of supporting something very like Finnis’s second line of
response has this to recommend it: the argument rests on an understanding of practical reason and its peculiarities alone.23 We do not need to
draw upon any substantive theological claim in order to see the force of
22. Finnis says:
Those who undertake to assess and compare the amounts of premoral
but humanly relevant goods and bads promised in alternative options are
bound to narrow their focus,to shrink the horizons of their assessment.
(For only thus can they make the assessment and comparison even seem
possible). And this narrowing cannot be guided by any moral principle
of responsibility. For either, Pursue the greatest premoral good is their
exclusive principle, or at least they maintain that moral principles generally applicable are overridden by the proportion of premoral goods and
bads promised by one option compared with others in a situation of
“conflict”.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 17-18. Finnis continues this observation in two distinct
directions. The first reaches out to an audience of believers and unbelievers alike.
The second relies upon sacred doctrine. Concentrate upon the first. On that side,
Finnis concludes the passage I have just quoted by claiming that setting out knowingly to do a bad act for the sake of bringing about good cannot be grounded in
reason but must instead be a matter of emotion, want, or desire. Kant would have
put the point this way: such an act will always turn upon an error in practical
reasoning. Notoriously, Kant chalks up such failures to the operations of mere
desire, self-love, and the like. In this sense as well there is an affinity between
Finnis’s second line of response and Kant’s practical philosophy.
23. Kant treated the kind of process at issue in Thompson’s remarks by suggesting that, in apprehending the teleological structure of vital processes and species of living thing, we in effect used our understanding of the nature of volition to
apprehend the natural world. In this sense, he took it that the order of events in
question had its proper home in an understanding of practical reason.
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the argument. As I mentioned, Kant’s god is a postulate of practical reason, not an almighty creator and legislator.24
There are, however, severe drawbacks to this account of the force of
absolute prohibitions. The first is this: the argument rests on what are, in
some sense, formal requirements of practical reason. Notoriously, work
on matters that are in this sense formal under-determines the substantive
content of what it surveys. Kant took it, for example, that his account of
practical reason and moral theory applied to any and all finite dependent
rational beings. For Kant, if the account works for human beings, this
cannot be because being human enters into the understanding of the nature of practical reason. He thought that, if he was right about the will,
then his account equally well applies to any existing finite dependent rational dolphins, any finite, dependent rational Martians and, given that
the Lucifer story suggests that even angels are capable of knowing the better and choosing the worse, to angels as well. There is no reason to suppose that the small set of absolute prohibitions that most contemporary
Anglophone ethicists will admit could apply across the whole range of beings that might count as Kantian finite dependent loci of pure practical
reason. (The same holds true for the broader set of exceptionless moral
norms at issue in Finnis’s work). For example, it is only possible to set out
deliberately to secure the judicial condemnation of someone you know to
be innocent if you are operating within a judicial system that could
wrongly condemn your intended victim. Whatever else one might say
about angels, that is not a thing they could do. There is no such thing as
pulling the wool over the eyes of the Judge they face.
The second problem is related to the first, and draws upon what
Thompson noticed about vital processes generally: all of them have the
kind of structure that interested Kant. Understanding any of them requires
getting a grip on what is supposed to happen, quite apart from merely
chemical or physical estimation of what does, or did, or likely will happen.
Worse, perfectly appropriate exercises of human practical reason involve
altering not just how things do go with species of living things, but also how
things are supposed to go. Wander through any garden containing tea roses
or annual geraniums or dahlias. You will find yourself in a glorious world
of cultivars. For any of them, some part of how things are supposed to go
in spring is a product of human art working with plant material. Kant will
have no quarrel with this, and I cannot imagine that Finnis will take issue
with ardent practitioners of ornamental horticulture. For Kant, but not
for Finnis, details about the natures of species of living things are irrelevant from the point of view of practical reason. But for that very reason, it
is unclear how Kant could object to a genetic engineering project that set
24. For an all-around excellent discussion of the relation between the practical postulates in Kant and an understanding of the kind of good that orders the
practical orientation of finite, dependent rational beings, see Stephen Engstrom,
The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant’s Moral Theory, PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES., Dec. 1992, at 747-80.
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out to alter how things are supposed to go in the human species. Finnis
will have powerful objections to any such science project.
In short, the kind of support needed in Finnis’s second response to
the Geach objection cannot be got from Kant. The problem runs parallel
to the trouble with the Humean construe: in supporting one aspect of
Finnis’s position, it undermines the ground for much of the rest of it.
V.

THE THIRD WAY

Finnis’s third line of response to Geach’s objection does, in fact, say
what Geach takes to be required to address the objection adequately.
Here is what Finnis says:
To deny the truth of moral absolutes by arguing that they block
the reasonable and responsible pursuit of greater amounts of
premoral good is incoherent with faith in divine providence.25
What sacred doctrine adds to philosophy to get us past Geach’s objection
is precisely an understanding of divine providence, and, in the relevant
tradition, understanding of divine providence opens onto an understanding of the root of natural law in divine law.
Matthew O’Brien has taken up this point and explored it in considerable detail recently in a careful defense of Anscombe’s insistence that we
require divine law ethics of the sort that informs Judeo-Christian thought
in order to give the appropriate sense to the special moral ought, and
thereby capture the force of absolute prohibitions. O’Brien summarizes
his defense of Anscombe (and of Geach’s insistence that the Christian has
the resources to respond to the claim that one can act ill in order to promote good or prevent evil) this way:
If someone does not believe in God, or believes in God but does
not believe that God intends—legislates—for him to strive for his
own perfection, then only the former, immanent source of moral
normativity remains. If someone does believe in a divine legislator, however, then choosing to cooperate with God’s plan is for
him practically necessary in order to achieve his own perfection,
and the authority of morality’s claims upon him will rest in the
authority of God. Apart from this theological framework, the authority of morality may continue to be felt in the reproaches of
blame, but its comprehensive binding force will not have a foundation in practical reason.26
I take it that Finnis’s invocation of faith in divine providence carries
with it all the necessary force of understanding God as both creator and
25. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 20.
26. Matthew O’Brien, Practical Necessity: A Study in Ethics, Law, and Human
Action 140 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at
Austin), http://catalog.lib.utexas.edu/record=b7762103~S29.
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legislator, and of natural law in the larger context of divine law. It provides the assurance necessary to uphold absolute prohibitions even when it
looks as though refusing to do wrong will result in catastrophe.27 My obligation to respect such prohibition is, on the reading of Aquinas at issue
for O’Brien, Anscombe, and Geach, an aspect of what I owe to God.
Far from it being merely ill-advised to fail to heed my obligations to
God, deliberate failure to honor these obligations is insane.
If I understand him, this point informs Finnis’s appreciation of the
force of moral absolutes. Having said that much, however, it looks as
though what is needed for this piece of Finnis’s project is the very religion
at issue in Finnis’s lectures on moral absolutes and in the corpus of St.
Thomas—sacred doctrine, not just a general account of practical reason.
27. Finnis is careful to point out that faith in divine providence on this matter
is not a license for thoughtless action:
[One] who, in accordance with a moral absolute, excludes an option as
wrong is not excused from doing everything morally possible to pursue
the goods which could not have been sought by violating the moral absolute. Such a person’s horizons are in no way narrowed. Indeed, the situation thus morally structured challenges the chooser to expand the
horizons of possibility with creativity and zeal.
FINNIS, supra note 1, at 17. The fact that, if Kant and Aquinas and Christian tradition are right, I am not permitted to lie to the murderer at the door does not mean
that I am not permitted to refuse to let him enter my house, or, should he rush
past me intent on murder, to assist his intended victim in locking him in the basement and telephoning the police, or to try to distract him, or, or, or.
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